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Knutson et al. performed functional MRI on individuals while the subjects were deciding whether
or not to purchase various items. Their results, reported in this issue of Neuron, support the theory
that the decision to purchase involves the integration of emotional signals related to the anticipation
of both obtaining the desired product and suffering the financial loss of paying for it.Human financial behavior is often
seemingly irrational, a fact that pro-
vides employment for advertisers,
casino workers, insurance salesmen,
and economists. Behavioral econom-
ics aims to explain financial decision-
making by appealing to psychology
to explain these ‘‘nonrational’’ behav-
iors. The relatively young field of
neuroeconomics attempts to bring
together economics and cogni-
tive neuroscience to uncover the
neural correlates of financial decision
making (Sanfey et al., 2006). It can
make two important contributions to
neuroscience: first, it brings several
well-validated paradigms drawn from
real-world financial behavior that are
often easy to administer in a laboratory
environment; second, the view of hu-
man (and animal) behavior as a con-
stant attempt by the individual to max-
imize utility allows specific predictions
to be made and encourages scientists
to look at brain function in novel ways
(Shizgal, 1997). The existence of math-
ematical formulas that depict utility
or value based on behavior is particu-
larly apt for functional MRI (fMRI) anal-
ysis, since it allows the generation of
continuous variables that can easily
be used as covariates in general linear
models.
One neuroeconomic theory that is
well suited to investigation by fMRI is
that potential gains and losses are
evaluated independently (i.e., by differ-
ent neural systems), and, more
specifically, that financial decisions
are guided by emotional biases, which
are presumably related to neural activ-
ity in brain regions involved in the
processing of positive and negative
emotion.In this issue of Neuron, Knutson
et al. (2007) used fMRI to test this the-
ory. Their premise was that the deci-
sion to buy a product on offer was
the result of a ‘‘hedonic competition
between the immediate pleasure of
acquisition and an equally immediate
pain of paying.’’ They measured the
neural correlates of financial deci-
sion-making in a shopping task. Sub-
jects were shown pictures of products
that were available for purchase. After
a short interval the price of the product
was displayed, and subjects were
given the opportunity to make the
purchase. Importantly, the paradigm
separated three periods in time: prod-
uct presentation, price, and decision,
allowing the investigators to identify
the different neural signals that con-
tribute to decision-making in this
case. After the scanning session sub-
jects rated each product for desirabil-
ity and the price they would be willing
to pay for it. These two behavioral
measures, along with the actual deci-
sion to purchase the product, were
then used as regressors to extract
neural signals of interest. The main
result is that product preference corre-
lated with activation of the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc), while price differ-
ential activated an area of medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC). In addition,
greater activity in the insula was asso-
ciated with nonpurchases. Moreover,
the blood oxygen level dependent
(BOLD) signal in these three regions
was strongly predictive of the decision
to purchase.
While other brain regions were also
found to be activated in each of these
contrasts, these three regions are of
particular interest. The NAcc has beenNeuron 5implicated in reward processing in
numerous human and animal studies:
in human fMRI studies it consistently
responds to the anticipation of mone-
tary gain (Breiter et al., 2001) and
desired foods (O’Doherty et al., 2002)
or to the administration of addictive
drugs (Breiter et al., 1997). The NAcc
is part of the striatum, and it receives
extensive cortical projections mostly
from limbic and paralimbic cortex
(Alexander et al., 1986). It has been de-
scribed as a key node in the conversion
of motivation into action (Mogenson
et al., 1980). Indeed, in the current
study, NAcc activation while viewing
the product predicted the later deci-
sion to purchase it. Similarly, the insula
has been linked to anticipation of mon-
etary loss, pain, and emotionally aver-
sive pictures (Paulus and Stein, 2006)
and may play an analogous role to the
NAcc in producing an appropriate be-
havioral response in risky or disadvan-
tageous situations (Sanfey et al., 2003).
It is interesting that a previous study
demonstrated that activation in these
two regions was predictive of risk-
seeking and risk-averse financial de-
cisions in a stock-picking paradigm
(Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005), confirm-
ing their role not only in generating an
affective response, but also in guiding
behavior. Finally, in the current study,
MPFC activation was greatest when
the price of the product was lower
than the price individuals were willing
to pay. This is consistent with data
showing that the MPFC tracks the dif-
ference between expected and actual
outcome in monetary reward tasks
(Knutson et al., 2003).
So, are there shopping centers in
the brain? One must be careful in3, January 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 7
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experiments. For example, although
the NAcc was activated by product
preference in this study, it does not
necessarily follow that it encodes this
value. Other fMRI studies have dem-
onstrated a dependence of NAcc
activation on novelty, unpredictability,
salience (Zink et al., 2003), or a change
in contingency (Cools et al., 2002),
independently of reward or prefer-
ence. We must remember that the
BOLD signal is dependent on the
activity of neural inputs into an area
(Logothetis and Pfeuffer, 2004). There-
fore, the BOLD signal in the NAcc (or
anyother region) in response to a visual
cue predicting some reward (e.g., a
food picture) might be expressed as





where the xi could represent sensory
features, satiety, motivation, novelty,
attention,motor planning, and the con-
current availability of other potential re-
wards. If in an experiment all but one of
the xi are kept constant, the BOLD
signal will be proportional to the re-
maining variable (y = a1 x1). However,
one would be wrong to then conclude
that the NAcc ‘‘does’’ or ‘‘encodes’’
x1. Indeed, one might conclude that
x1 (say, preference for the food) might
be encoded elsewhere in the brain,
and that this information was then re-
layed to the NAcc for integration with
other data. Similarly, the MPFC has
been implicated in experiments that
do not involve reward, suggesting8 Neuron 53, January 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsthat brain activity here may also be
related to attention (Small et al., 2003)
or anxiety (Simpson et al., 2001).
Certain questions remain unan-
swered. This study emphasizes the
role of affective responses to product
andprice; however, in real life purchas-
ingdecisions are also the result of plan-
ning, reflection, and deliberation, func-
tions that are likely mediated by
associative and lateral prefrontal corti-
cal areas. How do these systems inter-
act with limbic structures to produce
behavior? Is there a neural currency
that the brain uses to assign value to
different rewards and behaviors?
Which neurotransmitters are involved?
What types of dysfunction in these
neural systems explain pathological
disorders such as compulsive shop-
ping and problem gambling?
A better understanding of the brain
regions involved in financial decision-
making, along with their role in other
nonfinancial behaviors, could also
help explain the irrational economic
behaviors alluded to earlier. The brain
network implicated in the study by
Knutson et al. existed long before the
development of commerce. Perhaps
optimum function related to finding
food or mates and avoiding predators
is what leads to nonoptimum behav-
iors when deciding to obtain insur-
ance, buy a product by credit card,
or walk into a casino.
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